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"Will the Eichmann case help promote the healthy growth of international law?" Posing this ques-
tion as delineating the scope of his investigation of the implications of the Eichnann case, Mr.
Kittrie seeks to determine how the concepts of international law have been affected by the capture,
the trial, and the punishment of Adolph Eichmann.-EDrroR.
Two seconds before midnight, on May 30, 1962,
a few short hours after his petition to the President
of Israel for clemency was denied, Adolph Eich-
mann was hanged. Within hours, his body having
been cremated pursuant to his own request, the
ashes were taken up into the air by a military air-
plane and were spread upon the Mediterranean.
Thus more than two years after his clandestine
capture in Argentina and following a four-month
televised trial, in which 111 surviving witnesses
testified for the prosecution, came an end to the
Third Reich's leading expert on the Final Solution
to the Jewish Problem. The story of Eichmann's
capture, Argentina's protest, the debate in the
United Nations, the announcement of the trial,
the terrible drama told in the courtroom, Eich-
mann's lean and precise figure sitting in his glass
cage scribbling notes to his German counsel, his
defense, his appeal, and his last plea for mercy,
were continuously in the world press and on the
movie and television screens, making this case one
of the best recorded in the annals of world law.
During this time it was the personal story of Eich-
mann and his victims that occupied the limelight.
The moral and political implications of the case, the
element of historical justice, the legality of the
trial in light of the violation of Argentina's sover-
eignty by Eichmann's captors, Israel's design
publicly to record the full tragic story of her people,
the story of the total collapse of law and morality
in the 20th Century in the center of Europe,
Western Germany's role as the democratic suc-
cessor to Hitler's Nazi empire and the question of
the responsibility of her people, all these provided
the case with numerous elements of unusual in-
terest. Still, to many observers the trial of Eich-
mann probably consisted of merely one ancient
question: 'Will justice be done? Will the killer be
punished?"
Now that the political and emotional tensions
have subsided and the record of the deeds and
punishment of Adolph Eichmann can be examined
with a more detached historical sense, a very im-
portant question still remains to be answered:
"Will the Eichmann case help promote the healthy
growth of international law?" To answer this
question one needs to examine in detail both the
factual background and the various concepts of
international law which have been affected by the
capture, the trial, and the punishment of Adolph
Eichmann, the only man to be executed in the 14
year history of the State of Israel.
Tnn LEGAI or EimAN's CAPT=
Eichmann was apparently apprehended in Ar-
gentina, where he was living under a disguise, by
special agents of the Israeli authorities. The Israeli
government subsequently subscribed to conflicting
versions as to the official role of the government in
this capture, stating at one time that government
agents participated in his pursuit and capture from
the very beginning and stressing later that Eich-
mann was captured by "volunteers," members of a
private group, and was then flown to Israel where
he was officially surrendered to the authorities.
There was no extradition treaty between Argentina
and Israel at the time of the abduction. In the
absence of such treaty the two governments could
have nevertheless negotiated Eichmann's sur-
I N.Y. Times, May 29, 1960, §1, p. 3, col, 1.
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render to Israel for trial.2 Moreover, as Eichmann
had reputedly entered Argentina under false
credentials, that country could have expelled him
as an illegal alien.3 But whether the government of
Argentina would have been willing to undertake
such action is highly questionable in light of in-
ternal political conditions: the strong influence
exerted by rightist elements, the precarious balance
of political power, and the past experience of pro-
viding refuge to Nazi and Fascist functionaries.
Argentina lodged an official complaint with the
United Nations Security Council stating that the
forcible abduction of Adolph Eichmann was a
clear violation of international law and an invasion
of its sovereignty. However, after Israel made its
apology the matter was declared closed in a joint
communique issued by the two nations on August
3, 1960.4 The failure of the United Nations and
Argentina to insist upon Eichmann's return thus
seemed technically to cure the illegality of the
capture. As an individual Eichmann had no stand-
ing in international law, and whatever rights he
possessed had to be enforced on his behalf by an
aggrieved nation. The desire to avoid the embar-
rassing situation which the possession of Eich-
mann's person would have posed and the reluctance
to awaken past memories kept the governments of
Argentina (within whose boundaries he was found),
Austria (of which he was a naturalized citizen),
and Germany (whose Third Reich he served) from
making a claim for or on behalf of Eichmann.
Since all concerned nations waived their right to
Eichmann, Israel appeared free, within the frame-
work of its own law, to pursue with regard to him
a conduct of its own choice.
2 Although every sovereign country has the power to
grant or deny extradition, most countries have executed
treaties which set forth the particular offenses for which
extradition will be granted. See, Comment, 43 MINN.
L.R. 587 (1959). For a complete discussion of the
subject see GARCIA-MoRA, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
AsyLum AS A Hu, ,u RIGHT (1956); Garcia-Mora,
The Present Status of Political Offenses in the Law of
Extradition and Asylum, 14 U. P=:. L. R.v. 371 (1953).
The view has been expressed that the grant by any
country of asylum to a person accused of a major crime
of this type and the prevention of his prosecution is
contrary to the nation's obligation under international
law. 2 OrmENs & LAUTERPAC T, INTERNATIONAL
LAw 588, n.4 (7th ed. 1952). In 1864 the United States
sent one Arguelles to Spain without benefit of a treaty,
relying on comity and general principles of inter-
national law. See 1 MooRE, TREATISE ON EXTRADITION
AND I ERSTATE RENDITION 33-35 (1891).3 Eichmann's basic identification paper was a
stateless identity card issued by the Vatican in 1947
under a false name. See Baade, The Eichmann Trial:
Some Legal Aspects, 1961 DuK. I.. 400, 410.
4 N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1960, §1, p. 1, col. 5.
It is generally agreed, despite occasionally heard
opposition, that "once a prisoner is within the
physical control of a particular court and properly
charged, according to the law of almost every na-
tion, he may be tried by that court regardless of
the manner by which he was brought before it."5
The question of jurisdiction of a national court
following seizure or arrest in violation of inter-
national law is one which has continued to bother
international lawyers despite a long tradition of
judicial approval of the practice.6 Since the 17th
Century a great number of decisions of the highest
English and American courts have held that a
court's jurisdiction to condemn or forfeit a ship
brought within reach of its process is not affected
by the fact that the ship was seized within the
territorial waters of another state and hence in
violation of international law. Likewise, English
and American prize courts have held that captures
made in violation of neutral territorial waters will
be restored only upon the demand of the neutral
state. As against an individual enemy or neutral
claimant, such captures are regarded as validY
In a leading English case, Sir W. Scott reiterated
that it was "a known principle" of his court that
"the privilege of territory will not itself enure to
the protection of property, unless the State from
which that protection is due, steps forward to
assert the right."8 This same philosophy was sub-
scribed to by the United States Supreme Court as
far back as 1815.9 In the case of The Richnwnd0
5 Leavy, The Eichmann Trial and the Role of Law,
48 A.B.A.J. 820, 822 (1962); Baade, The Elchmann
Trial: Some Legal Aspects, 1961 DU=E L.J. 400; Green,
The Eichmann Case, 23 MOD. L. REv. 507 (1960).
0 One clear exception is provided by the case of In
re olis, France, Tribunal Correctionnel de' Avesnes,
July 22, 1933, Annual Digest 1933-1934 at 191 (1940).
In this case a Belgian subject was kidnapped by French
officials on Belgian territory and was taken to France for
trial. The French Tribunal held: "The arrest, effected
by French officers on foreign territory, could have no
legal effect whatsoever and was completely null and
void. This nullity being of a public nature, the judge
must take judicial notice thereof... all that followed
thereon must therefore be annulled." Id. at 191.
The Eliza Ann, 1 Dods 244, 165 Eng. Rep. 1298
(1813); The Valeria, 1 A.C. 477 (1921); The Sir William
Peel, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 517 (1866); The Florida, 101
U.S. 37, 42 (1879).
"The Purissima Conception, 6 C. Rob. 45, 47, 165
Eng. Rep. 844, 845 (1805).
9 It should be emphasized that the Anglo-American
rule differs from that of the leading European countries.
GARNER, PR= LAw DuRING T WORLD WAs (1927),
reports that the prize tribunals of France, Germany and
Italy consider a capture made in violation of neutral
territorial waters as "absolutely illegal irrespective of
whether... the neutral power intervenes or not."
Id. at 227.
10 13 U.S. (9 Cr.) 102 (1815).
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an American vessel was seized by a United States
man-of-war in the territorial waters of East Florida
then belonging to Spain, and was forfeited to the
United States for the violation of the Non-Inter-
course Act of 1809. Delivering the opinion of the
United States Supreme Court, in which the
sentence of condemnation was affirmed, Chief
Justice Marshall said:
"The seizure of an American vessel within the
territorial jurisdiction of a foreign power, is
certainly an offence against that power, which
must be adjusted between the two govern-
ments. This court can take no cognizance of it;
and the majority of the court is of opinion, that
the law does not connect that trespass, if it be
one, within the subsequent seizure by the civil
authority, under the process of the district court,
so as to annul the proceedings of that court
against the vessel.""u
Interestingly enough the strongest opposition
to this interpretation of international law in our
domestic law was voiced in the United States in
the middle 1930's, as a direct result of some of
the illegal kidnapings by Nazi agents in countries
adjoining the Third Reich. In an article published
in 1935, Lawrence Preuss recited the details of
several kidnapings by Nazi agents on Swiss and
Czech territory. The author then maintained that
there is an obligation on the part of the kidnaping
state to restore a prisoner to the asylum state and
to punish the offending officers." In another leading
article published a year earlier, Professor Edwin
Dickinson argued against the jurisdiction of
national courts over persons illegally seized. Said
he: "If there is no national competence, obviously
there can be no competence in the courts, which
are only an arm of the national power. To hold
otherwise, it may be urged, would go far to defeat
the purpose and nullify the efficacy of interna-
tional law.""3
Despite the arguments that "surely it is a scho-
lastic subtlety which would distinguish the com-
" Id. at 103.
2"When a fugitive has been kidnaped by private
persons, and, having been brought by force to the
territory of a foreign state, is there arrested, there
appears to be no obligation to release the prisoner.
International responsibility is incurred only through
official complicity. A fortiori, there is no obligation to
surrender the prisoner when officials of the state of
asylum have participated in the irregular seizure or
arrest." Preuss, Kidnaping of Fugitives from Justice on
Foreign Territory, 29 Ams. J. INT'L L. 502, 507 (1935).
"3 Dickinson, Jurisdiction Following Seizure or
Arrest in Violation of International Law, 28 Am J.
INT'L L. 231 (1934).
petence of the nation and the competence of the
court through which the nation acts,"" the Ameri-
can courts have not been willing to condition their
jurisdiction on whether a person standing trial
was brought within the court's jurisdiction le-
gally.15 The United States Supreme Court in
Frisbie v. Collins stated:
"This Court has never departed from the rule
announced in Ker v. Illinois... that the power
of a court to try a person for crime is not im-
paired by the fact that he had been brought
within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a
'forcible abduction'.... Due process of law is
satisfied when one present in court is convicted
of a crime after having been fairly apprized of
the charges against him and after a fair trial in
accordance with Constitutional procedural safe-
guards. There is nothing in the Constitution
that requires a court to permit a guilty person
rightfully convicted to escape justice because he
was brought to trial against his will."'"
Apparently there is nothing in international law
that would prohibit an exercise of national juris-
diction following an illegal capture. In its final
judgment the Israeli court in the Eichmann case
discussed British and American decisions relating
to this issue and indicated that Palestinian case
law, which constitutes precedent for Israel, has
adopted the unequivocal American view that a
court may not inquire into the manner by which a
prisoner was brought before it. 7 Although legally
the Israeli court's authority over Eichmann could
4 Id. at 236.
15 But see, The Mazl Toy case, Cook v. United States,
288 U.S. 102 (1933), as a possible indication of a new
trend holding that seizure in violation of a specific
international treaty rather than a general rule of
international law was invalid. It should be noted that
in other areas of criminal law we have long adhered to
the maxim of "ex injuria jus non critur" out of which
grew the principle that one should not be permitted to
benefit from the "fruit of the poisonous tree." See Elkins
v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961). A survey of state cases in this
area is provided by Scott, Criminal Jurisdiction of a
State Over a Defendant Based Upon Presence Secured by
Force or Fraud, 37 Mnm. L.R. 91 (1953). After report-
ing that most states permit trial of kidnapped persons,
Scott concludes: "This is inconsistent with the views of
at least some of these states as to analogous situations
in the fields of criminal and civil procedure." Id. at 107.
See also Garcia-Mom, Criminal .Turisdition of a State
over Fugitives Brought From a Foreign Country by Force
or Fraud: A Comparative Study, 32 IND. L.J. 427 (1957).
16 Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952); Ker
v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886).
17Attorney General v. Adolph Eichmann, Crim.
Case 40/61, Jerusalem District Court, passage 7
(hereinafter cited as Trial Judgment, with passage
number following).
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hot be challenged, a bad taste of justice achieved
through an unlawful act still remained with those
who firmly believe that the future of the world
depends upon nations conforming in all instances
with higher rules of international conduct.18
Others less sensitive to procedural proprieties have
argued that the abduction was justified by the
nature and extent of the crimes charged and by
the impossibility of extradition of Nazis from
Argentina. Indeed, they assert that in some ex-
treme situations the strict standards of positive
law must yield to the natural and the moral law,19
and that the situation in this case called for a law
akin to the natural law of self-defense.2
Reviewing the inability of international law
effectively to curtail the practice of illegal kid-
napings, one must draw the conclusion that the
Eichmann case has called new attention to a very
important deficiency in the law. Both international
law and order and individual justice make it in-
advisable to continue the present rule of interna-
tional law which makes a person's fate completely
dependent upon the political and judicial consider-
ations of the nation from which he was illegally
captured. Clearly, the practice of kidnaping can
be curbed only if the kidnaping nation will not be
permitted to benefit from the fruits of its crime. A
captive's return, however, is not always practica-
ble. In cases where the captive's nation is unwilling
to accept him back or generally in cases where
the crime charged was one recognized in interna-
tional law, it would appear preferable to provide
for the prisoner's trial by an international tribu-
nal. Another remedy, which would provide only a
partial answer, would be the institution of an
international writ of habeas corpus, proposed in
recent years.2 But such writ would merely permit
18 Woetzel, The Eichmann Case in International Law,
1962 Cam. L. Rlv. (N.Y.) 671 (1962); Cardozo, When
Extradition Fails, Is Abduction the Solution, 55 Am.
J. INT'L L. 127 (1961).
19 Schwarzenberger, The Ekhmann Judgment, 1962
CURmENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 248, 249, asserts that one
must "avoid the traps of the sterile variety of positivism
and an eclectic identification of natural law with
positive law" in order "to cope above board with the
major issues on the appropriate legal and ethical
levels."
2o Silving, In Re Eihmann: A Dilemma of Law and
Morality, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 307 (1961). In support of
the position that a court need not inquire into the
circumstances of the apprehension of a person held on
a criminal charge, it was observed that "in criminal
cases the interest of the public overrides that which is,
after all, a mere privilege from arrest." In Re Johnson,
167 U.S. 120 (1897) (per Brown, J.).2
1 Kutner, A Proposal for a United Nations Writ of
an opportunity to question the legality of the
captive's detention; it would provide no tribunal
for his trial after his release from the jurisdiction
wrongfully detaining him. Since it is self-evident
that to permit a nation to obtain custody over a
person through an illegal act and thereupon to
proceed to try him under its own laws, without
any form of international supervision, does not
appear to further the interests of an international
rule of law, we must hope for early reforms in this
area.n2
Tun JtlRISnICTioN oP IsRAEL's CoURT
To TRY ElcMLANN
To lawyers and students of international law,
one of the most interesting aspects of the Eichmanm
case was the question of the jurisdiction of the
Israeli court to try him for crimes committed out-
side the State of Israel and, indeed, before the
state came into being. The question of jurisdiction
can be divided into two separate phases: the first
concerns the retroactive nature of Israel's 1950
law which provides for the punishment of Nazis
and Nazi collaborators;2 the second relates to the
extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Israeli courts to
try a person for crimes committed outside the
national boundaries.
The legal literature dealing with the Eichmann
trial revolves primarily around these points. Both
the opinion of the District Court which tried Eich-
mann and the Supreme Court of Israel which
heard the appeal devoted considerable space to
the question of jurisdiction.N It should be stated
at the outset, however, that the question of juris-
diction was never properly before the Israeli
courts. Israel does not have a written constitution.
Since Israel's courts conform generally to the
British judicial tradition, the American concept of
Habeas Corpus and an International Court of Human
Rights, 28 TuL. L. REv. 417 (1954). See also Katz, The
Role of Law in International Affairs as Illustrated by the
Eichmann Case, 84 N.J.L.J. No. 2, p. 1 (1961), sug-
gesting the right of an individual to sue for his release
in the International Court of Justice. Also of interest
is the draft statute for an International Court of Human
Rights proposed by Australia in 1948. U.N. Doe.
N/CN. 4/AC 1127 (May 10, 1948).
22 Scott, supra note 15, at 107, calls similarly for a
rule of procedure in our domestic law "which would
forbid courts to try accused persons who have been
subjected to [this] type of lawless treatment." See also
Garcia-Mora, supra note 2, at 449 (1953): "one can
entertain the hope that the courts will reconsider
... and [will] finally recognize the unsoundness of their
position."
23 4 Israel Law 154 (5710-1949/50).24Trial Judgment 7-11.
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judicial review is unknown. Consequently, once
Israel's legislature has enacted statutes authorizing
the courts to try and punish certain offenses, it is
beyond the power of the courts to question the
validity of such legislation. 25 Lacking the power
to overturn the law under which Eichmann was to
be tried, the Israeli court, nevertheless, dealt with
the issue quite directly, realizing that the manner
of its resolution of the jurisdictional issue will have
a bearing not only upon world opinion but also
upon the development of Israel's domestic law
and the growth of international law.
Counsel for Adolph Eichmarn argued that the
crimes committed by the defendant preceded the
establishment of the State of Israel and conse-
quently the statutes under which Eichmann was
tried were not only retroactive but, also, the acts
of a state which was non-existent at the time of
the cime. The Nazi and Nazi Collaborators Law
was therefore, strictly speaking, an ex post facto
law. Furthermore, the crimes committed by Eich-
mann were not committed on the territory of
Israel. The victims were not citizens of the State
of Israel or its predecessor, the Palestinian Man-
date Government. What, therefore, was the court's
authority for this trial?
Validity of Retroactive Legislation
The statute under which Eichmann was tried
was similar in scope to the provisions of the
multi-national agreement establishing the Inter-
national Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.26 In
both instances, punishment was authorized for
crimes hitherto ill-defined in international law:
"war crime," "crime against humanity," "crime
against peace. ' 'H In both instances, the specific
25 Leavy, supra note 5, at 822. Said the Supreme
Court of Israel in an earlier case: "Provided the
legislative authority has clearly demonstrated its
intention that the law which it has enacted shall have
extraterritorial effect, the local court will have to
... ignore completely the restriction imposed by the
principle of territorial sovereignty." Amsterdam v.
Minister of Finance, (1952) Int. Law. Rep. 229, 232.
26Agreement between the United Kingdom, the
United States, France and the USSR, Aug. 8, 1945.
Trial of War Criminals, Document, U.S. Dep't of
State, Pub. 2420, pp. 13-15 (1945).
2 The precise definition of these crimes in inter-
national law is of recent origin. Cowles in Universality
of Jurisdic-tion Over War Crimes, 33 CALIF. L. REv.
177, 181 (1945), advances the argument that what is
now called a "war crime" is the same type of offense
as was formerly styled an act of brigandage. He asserts
further that the term "war crime" was first used by
Oppenheim in 1906, in 2 OPPENHEIt, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 263. While Oppenheim, indeed, complained in
1906 that other writers of the Law of Nations have
laws under which the culprits were tried were not
in effect at the time the crimes were committed.
The Nuremberg court and, subsequently, the
United Nations General Assembly in its affirma-
tion of the charter and judgment of the tribunal
gave broad international recognition to the legality
of such ex post facto legislation.2 8 A substantial
school of legal scholars subscribes to the view that a
penal statute need not be condemned merely be-
cause of its retroactive effect, as long as the crime
penalized was obviously and undeniably pro-
hibited under the laws of most civilized nations.
hitherto not "systematically treated the question of
war crimes," he nevertheless treated these crimes as
domestic rather than international in nature, con-
cluding that the "belligerent can and actually must in
the interest of his own safety punish these acts" which
are "termed war crimes whatever may be the motive,
the purpose, and the moral character of the respective
act." Id. at 264. More specific and earlier acknowledg-
ment of the existence of rules of conduct in warfare, the
violation of which would constitute a "war crime," is
given by HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1895).
Hall recognizes the right of nations to punish for
"breach of universally acknowledged laws" of war.
Id. at §135. A similar position was taken by HOLLAND,
Tim LAW AND CUSTOMS OF WAR ON LAND, Nos. 117-18
(1904). Schwarzenberger, The Judgment at Nuremberg,
2 YEAaoon. o, WORLD Aiz.AIMs at 94-96 (1948),
asserts that the recognition of war crimes is far from
new and cites even medieval precedents, dating back to
1268. See also GOULD, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 666 (1957). It should be noted, also,
that the war standards established by the 4th Hague
Convention call for compensation rather than criminal
penalties for the violators. HAGUE REGULATiONS
RESPECTING THE LAW AnD CusToms OF WAR ON
LAND, Hague, Oct. 18, 1907. It is only in the post
World War II period that Oppenheim gives recognition
to the status of war crimes in international law, finally
asserting that "the notion of war crimes is based on the
view that states and their organs are subject to criminal
responsibility under International Law." 2 OPPENHEIM
& LAUTERPACET, INTERNATIONAL LAW 567 (7th ed.,
1952). It was the charter of the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg that officially defined the
meaning of "war crimes" ("violations of the law or
customs of war") and added to them as violations of
international law "crimes against humanity" ("murder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation ... before or
during the war.., whether or not in violation of the
domestic law of the country where perpetrated") and
"crimes against peace" ("planning... or waging of a
war of aggression, or a war in violation of international
treaties ... or assurances"). See Trial of the War
Criminals, U.S. Dep't of State, Pub. 2420, pp. 15, 16
(1945). The Israeli Nazi Punishment Law (4 Israel Law
154 (5710-1949/50)) under which Eichmann was tried
did not encompass "crimes against peace" but recog-
nized instead "crimes against the Jewish people"
which in the pattern of the U.N.'s Genocide Convention
(U.N. Doc. A/810, p. 174) consist of acts committed
with "intent to destroy the Jewish people in whole or
in part."
2 U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 1st Sess., 2nd pt., Plenary
1144 (A/236) (1946).
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It is the rationale of this position that in such cases
"the law is retroactive in form, not in substance,"
29
and the punishment is not therefore, liberally
speaking, retroactive 0 The validity of the law
has also been defended on the ground that the
terrible crimes of the Nazis required unusual penal
provisions, "for no sane legislator could have
contemplated such crime to be even possible and
no tribunal could have been provided for its ad-
judication in advance." '' A compelling defense of
the justice meted out at the Nuremberg Trial
states:
"[11f the act was a heinous violation of inter-
national law; if it was recognisable as such to
the individual; if he could reasonably be expected
to know that it was punishable; and if he in-
tended to do the thing he did which was in
violation of his duties and obligations under in-
ternational law.., there could be no violation




The Israeli court, in. a like vein, had this to say
with regard to the retroactive provisions of its
law:
"The Israel legislature embodied into domestic
law what have long been crimes under the law
of all civilized nations, including the German
people ... it cannot be said that the perpetrators
of the crimes defined in the law in question
'could not have a mens rea because they did
not know and could not know that what they
were doing was a criminal act,' [and further-
more:] There is [not] any taint of ex postfacto-
ism in the law of murder."3'
It needs to be stressed that there is in actuality
no binding prohibition in international law against
retroactive criminal statutes in domestic law. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights has taken
the first step in this direction, but its provisions
are not self-executing and must await future
legislation by the individual states for effectua-
2 Baade, supra note 3, at 412, 413.
- See the German concurring position in Jescheck,
Die Vemnntwortlichkeit Der Staatorgane Nach.
V61kerstrafrecht; eine Studie Zu Den Niimberger
Prozessen 373 (1952). See also Schwarzenberger, The
Eichmann Judgment, supra note 19, at 258: "a sovereign
state could hardly have better reason for passing
retroactive legislation than the revindication of the
minimum requirements of civilization, 'nor can any
court exercise jurisdiction on any worthier ground."
Stying, supra note 20, at 336.
'" WoxrzxL, ThE NURFmBERG Ipms IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 115, 116 (1960).
1 Trial Judgment 7.
tion. A nation enacting ex post facto laws will
therefore not be in violation of positive interna-
tional law, despite the fact that it may be con-
demned by world public opinion. Whether an
international law statute, which the Nuremberg
Charter may have been, providing retroactive
penalties is illegal may be another question. It is
noteworthy that regardless of its multi-national
character, the Nuremberg Tribunal was estab-
lished by the occupation forces then exercising
sovereignty over Germany, and its jurisdiction
indeed was claimed under both international law
and domestic law. The Israeli court was, on the
other hand, merely exercising its powers under
domestic law. In both instances the tribunals were
looking to the legal principles of other civilized
nations and to international law for justification,
moral support, permissive authority, and prec-
edent. It is in this light that the retroactive juris-
diction of the Nuremberg and Eichmann tribunals
must be judged.
The Nuremberg Charter claimed to derive per-
missive authority from the General Pact for the
Renunciation of War, popularly known as the
Kellogg-Briand Pact, which was signed at Paris
on August 27, 1928, and prohibited resort to war.3
Yet the Pact failed to proscribe criminal penalties
for its violators. 6 The Israeli court, similarly,
based much of its claim for authority upon inter-
national enactments and precedent which, al-
though dating prior to the adoption of the Israeli
law, were nevertheless not effectuated until after
34Article 11(2) of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, approved Dec. 10, 1948, by the U.N.
General Assembly, endorsed the principle of nullum
crimen nulla poena: "No one shall be held guilty of any
penal offense, on account of any act or omission which
did not constitute a penal offense, under national or
international law, at the time when it was committed."
U.N., YEARBOOK ON HuMw RIGHTS voR 1948, pp.
457, 467 (1950). A similar clause was inserted in
Article 13 of the Draft Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights of the Commission on Human Rights of the U.N.
U.N., YEARBOOK ON HuMAN RiGnTs ZOR 1952, pp.
424, 427 (1954).
"Lauterpacht, The Pad of Paris and the Budapest
Articles of Interpretation, 20 TRAsAcTIoNS OF THE
GROTus Soc'y 178 (1935).
36A strong argument against deriving criminal
penalties from the Paris Pact is advanced by Schick,
International Criminal Law-Facts and Illusions, 11
MOD. L. REv. 290 (1948). Schick says: "None of the
various non-aggression treaties concluded in the period
between the two World Wars permits the interpretation
that the perpetrators of an aggressive war may be
exposed to criminal prosecution .... Far from creating
an international criminal law the Pact of Paris was not
even intended to provide for penal sanctions against an
alleged aggressor state." Id. at 293.
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the crimes were committed. Indeed, it is interesting
to note that the acts with which Adolph Eich-
mann was charged may fall within the prohibition
of positive international law as it is now recog-
nized. "War crime" and "crime against humanity"
have been specifically defined in the Charter an-
nexed to the August 8, 1945, Agreement made in
London among the United Kingdom, the United
States, France, and the USSR establishing the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg."
The principles of law embodied in the Charter and
in the judgment of the Tribunal were affirmed as
international law by a unanimous resolution of the
United Nations General Assembly on December 11,
194.8 s Eichmann's terrible record of violence and
atrocities also falls within the definition of genocide
as contained in the United Nations Resolution
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide and in the text of the Convention
adopted by the General Assembly on December 9,
1948. 39
The Israeli court indicated that following World
War II several nations affected by the aggression
and atrocities of the Third Reich enacted statutes
similar to Israel's Nazi law.40 Yet the fact that
international law now contains sufficient positive
provisions to penalize similar conduct in the future,
does not fully answer the question as to the legality
of the retroactive laws pertaining to deeds com-
mitted in the past. Despite the Jerusalem District
Court's reiteration that there is not "any taint of
ex post facto-ism in the law of murder," still, the
fear remains of abuses that could be made in the
name of international law. There is always the
fear that a victorious nation or group of nations
will join together to define as criminal conduct such
activities as they consider contrary to their own
7The London agreement and the Nuremberg trial
relied greatly on an interpretation which sees in the
Pact of Paris authority for individual criminal responsi-
bility for aggressive war. See Schick, supra note 36, at
294, 295. Justice Jackson in his opening speech before
the Nuremberg tribunal clearly sets forth the con-
struction according to which a war in violation of the
Pact is illegal in international law and that those who
plan and wage such war are, therefore, committing a
crime. H.M. STATIONARY OFFIcE, THE TRIAL or
GERmAN MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, OPENING SPEECHES
or T CHIEF PRosacuioas (1946).
38 U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. Ist Sess., 2nd pt., Plenary
1144 (A/236) (1946).
39 U.N. Doc. A/810, p. 174. For a discussion of this
subject as well as a general review of the need for the
growth of international law in the area of protection of
the rights of individuals, see JEssu'p, A MODERN LAW
OF NATIONS 92, 101, 103 (1950).
40 Trial Judgment 37.
interests. There is always the fear that the winner
may not be a nation with "right motives" but one
with "wrong motives." The only solution is ap-
parently in the drafting of an international code
under which, and only under which, punishment is
to be meted out-whether by domestic or inter-
national tribunals. Possibly for the future, one of
the more interesting aspects of the Eichmann trial
will be the fact of his trial, by a domestic court and
under a domestic law, for conduct which at the
time of the trial had already become prohibited by
positive international law.4'
Extraterritoriality of Legislation
Shortly after Eichmann's capture, Brigadier
General Telford Taylor, who previously served as a
chief prosecutor at Nuremberg, voiced his concern
that trying Eichmann in Israel, rather than in
Germany, would be contrary to the traditions of
the law. It was General Taylor's position that
under the generally accepted principles of law a
man is entitled to be tried where his offense is
charged to have been committed, and he proceeded
further to substantiate his view by arguing that:
"This right is guaranteed in the 6th Amendment
to the Constitution and its origin antedates the
Magna Carta where it is also to be found."4' Other
writers have also concerned themselves with the
question of Israel's jurisdiction to try Eichmann
for crimes committed elsewhere, since the juris-
diction of nations is limited in most cases to crimes
committed within their national boundaries.
Several exceptions have, however, been recog-
nized.43 Nations, under a theory described as the
"principle of active personality" or "nationality
principle," often assume jurisdiction over criminal
acts performed by their nationals in foreign
countries.M Likewise, the right of national juris-
diction has been recognized, under a theory de-
scribed as the "principle of passive personality,"
in cases where crimes, although committed outside
41 For an analysis of the Nuremberg trial as precedent
for the future see GLuEcK, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL
AND AGGREssrVE WAR 99 (1946).42 Taylor, Large Questions in the Eidlmann Case, N.Y.
Times Magazine 11, 22 (Jan. 22, 1961).
41 For a discussion of the various princinles see
Pella, Towards an International Criminal Court, 4t
Am. J. INT'L L. 37, 46 (1950); and Comment, 46
CORNELL L.Q. 326, 329-30 (1961). See also Robinson,
Eichrnann and the Question of Jurisdiction, 30 Consm.x-
TARY 1 (1960).
See Chandler v. United States, 171 F. 2d 921 (1st
Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949), involving
an American broadcasting abroad for the enemy.
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the national territory, affected citizens of the try-
ing nation.45 Also given recognition is the "principle
of real protection" or "protective theory," per-
mitting national jurisdiction in cases of crimes
committed abroad against the most essential in-
terests of the state.46 None of these specific excep-
tions applies in the case of Eichmann. The crimes
were committed outside the territory of Israel, and,
strictly speaking, the vital interests of the State.of
Israel, not being yet in existence, could not have
been directly at stake.
Eichmann's counsel argued this point. He
reiterated that there was absent a linking point
between the crimes and Israel because territoriality
was the only true basis of jurisdiction. The Israeli
trial court responded vigorously to the suggestion
that jurisdiction lay only in the countries of Europe
where the crimes were committed. Considering
this argument as absurd, the court stated bitterly:
"In other words, eighteen nations do have the
right to punish the accused for the murder of
Jews who resided in their territories, but the
nation of those who were murdered has no right
to inflict such punishment because those persons
were not extermined on its territory."07
The court could not understand anybody's failing
to see the connection between Israel and the Nazi
holocaust. "The connection between the State
of Israel and the Jewish people needs no explana-
tion," the court concluded.48
Whether or not Israel's extraterritorial Nazi
Punishment Law conforms with the standards of
American constitutional law, its provisions are
not contrary to the general legal practices in the
world. There appears to exist no rule of interna-
tional law governing the penal jurisdiction of
national courts. In the now classical Lotus case
the question of jurisiction came. up before the
Permanent Court of International Justice.49 That
case developed from a collision between the French
steamship Lotus and the Turkish freighter Boz-
4 5 Comment, 46 ComEL L.Q. 326, 329 (1961).
46National jurisdiction is recognized in cases of
crimes committed abroad by aliens "against the
security, territorial integrity, or political independence'
of the state" by the Draft Convention on Jurisdiction
with Respect to Crimes, art. 7, HARVAn RESEARCH m
TERNAmONAL LAw, AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 440 (Spec.
Supp. 1935). See United States ex rd. Majka v. Palmer,
67 F. 2d 146 (7th Cir. 1933), involving perjury com-
mitted before American consul abroad.0 Trial Judgment 34.
4 8 Ibi.
49 P.C.IJ., ser. A., No. 10 (1927). Also in 2 HunsoN,
WORMD COURT REPORTs 23.
Kourt, on the high seas. The Boz-Kourt was sunk
and eight Turkish nationals perished. After at-
tending to the safety of the survivors, the Lotus
continued her voyage to Constantinople. Turkey
apprehended the officer on the watch on the Lotus
at the time of the collision and tried him for in-
voluntary manslaughter. Following the officer's
conviction the French and Turkish governments
submitted the question of Turkey's jurisdiction
to the World Court. Holding in favor of Turkey,
the court concluded that:
"International law does not prevent states from
exercising jurisdiction in their own territory in
cases involving acts committed abroad, where
there can be no reliance on some permissive rule
of international law."''5
The court also went on to say that, where there is
no prohibitive rule of international law, "every
state remains free to adopt the principles which
it regards as best and most suitable."'"
There is, however, no total silence in interna-
tional law and practice with regard to the extension
of jurisdiction beyond the territorial boundaries.
Indeed, the special nature of the crimes charged
against Eichmann possibly permits the raising of
the international law principle of universality of
jurisdiction. International law has long recognized
certain crimes as being universally reprehensible
and has marked the offenders as hostes generis
humani (enemies of the human race) and subject
to trial any place. Piracy has been accorded this
special status, both because piracy is everywhere
made a crime and because piracy is often com-
mitted on the high seas over which no nation has
jurisdiction. The punishment of brigands, likewise,
has been said to come within the rule of univer-
sality. Grotius specifically expressed the view that
the power to punish such persons was derived from
the law of nations:
"The fact must also be recognized that kings,
and those who possess rights equal to those
kings, have the right of demanding punishments
not only on account of injuries committed
against themselves or their subjects, but also on
account of injuries which do not directly affect
them but excessively violate the law of nature
or of nations in regard to any persons whatso-
ever."n
Could the same principle be extended to other
50Id. at 19.
1 Id. at 20.
12 GROTtos, DE JuRE BEmiu AC PAcis Lmais TRs
[16461 504 (Carnegie trans. 1925).
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crimes which are generally recognized? Could the
principle be extended whenever a crime is com-
mitted in a territory or a country where no ade-
quate judicial system is in existence-as was the
case with Nazi Germany?"
In 1926 the Rumanian jurist, Vespasian Pella,
argued:
"Absolute piracy (piracy jure gentium) is re-
garded today as an offense of a special character
because it is punishable wherever encountered.
We already see here in embryo the principle-
which in future social relations, will become the
practice-of penalising throughout the world
violations of laws which are common in every
country.
' 'H
Several years later, in 1933, Raphael Lemkin,
author of the now accepted Genocide Convention,
submitted a proposal to the International Con-
ferencp for Unification of Criminal Law which
would have made it a crime under the law of
nations (delictum juris gentium) to exterminate
racial, religious, or social collectivities. The crime
was to be punishable irrespective of the place in
which the crime was committed and irrespective
of the nationality of the criminal."5 Despite the
rejection of the proposal at that time, it served to
highlight the future trend.
The present scope of universality of jurisdiction
in international law is uncertain. It should be
noted, however, that some writers have argued
that states now have the right to try aliens for
other crimes similar to piracy committed outside
their territory, and these crimes have been de-
scribed to include slave trade; traffic in women,
children, narcotics, and pornographic literature;
abuses of radio; and destruction of submarine
cables.56 Likewise, attention should be given to
the 1951 advisory opinion of the International
Court which stated that the right to try an in-
dividual for a crime against humanity was uni-
versal and could be exercised by any nation in
whose custody an accused rested.n
"See, on thisparticular question, Cowles, Universality
of Jurisdiction Over War Crimes, 33 CALi. L. Rv. 177
(1945).
4Reply of Roumania (drafted by M. Pella) Nov. 20,
1926, to Questionnaire No. 6, propounded by the
League of Nations Committee of Experts for the
Progressive Codification of International Law, League
of Nations Doc. No. c. 196.M. 70, 1927 V., at 202
(1927).
55 Lemkin, Genocide as a Crime Under Inrnational
Law, 41 ABL J. INT'L L. 145, 146 (1947).
56 
WOETZEL, THE NuREmBERG TRIALs IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 64 (1960); Pelia, supra note 43, at 54.
"Trial Judgment 18. Advisory opinion of Inter-
There appears to be no compelling argument
against extending the concept of universality as
such. The Israeli court, in passing judgment on
Eichmann, made the interesting observation that
the territorial principle is by no means the only
basis of jurisdiction and that indeed it is only a
compulsory minimumAs The conclusion seems
valid that:
"[Tihe notion that states may punish only
offenses actually or at least constructively com-
mitted on their territories is merely a rule of
Anglo-American internal criminal law, which
again, of course, is subject to many exceptions..
.. [V]irtually all systems of criminal law reach
much further."59
Yet it would be dangerous for the healthy growth
of international law to delegate to each nation
the authority to extend the rule of universality as
it may see fit. If universality of jurisdiction is to
expand, it is best that it does so through the es-
tablishment of pre-agreed international standards.
In asserting jurisdiction over Eichmann's crime,
Israel was, in fact, not merely arguing for the ex-
tension of the rule of universality, but also claiming
to have derived its right, at least in part, from its
special relationship to a large portion of the vic-
tims-those of the Jewish heritage. Israel's court
stressed that Israel's right to represent Jews who
had no nationality or who were the victims of Nazi
oppression was recognized by the Federal Republic
of Germany in the 1952 Reparation Agreement
between Israel and West Germany. 60 The court,
in its judgment, compared the special relationship
between the victims and the State of Israel to the
relationship between the root and branch of a tree
and its trunk." Indeed, one of the subtle thrusts
of the judgment seems to be the assertion of
Israel's sovereignty and right to protect the legal
rights of Jewish people wherever they may be
found.6
This emphasis on a special right of jurisdiction,
based on the racial or religious affiliation of the
victims, may require careful analysis. At least one
leading commentator had expressed concern, even
before the trial, because Eichmann's trial was to be
national Court of Justice with regard to the reserva-
tions to the Genocide Convention, May 28, 1951.
58 Trial Judgment 25.
"9 Baade, The Eichmann Trial: Some Legal Aspects,
1961 DuxE L.J. 400, 416.
10 Agreement between Israel and the German
Federal Republic, Sept. 10, 1952 (Document, Jerusalem,
1953).
61 Trial Judgment 35.
6Leavy, supra note 5, at 824.
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under a law specifically penalizing "crimes against
the Jewish people." Said General Taylor:
"[T]o proscribe the murder of Jews as a crime
against Jews carries the dangerous implication
that it is not a crime against non Jews....
Nuremberg was based on the proposition that
atrocities against Jews and non Jews are
equally crimes against world laws .... [T]o de-
fine a crime in terms of the religion or nationality
of the victim, instead of the nature of the crim-
inal act, is wholly out of keeping with the needs
of the times and trend of modern law."n'
The explanation has been offered, in partial answer
to this argument, that in referring to "crimes
against the Jewish people" the Israeli law was
merely classifying the object of the crime, similar
to the way a statute book may divide offenses ac-
cording to whether they are "crimes against prop-
erty" or "crimes against a person."' 4 Furthermore,
such legal classification is not intended to imply
that only the object of the crime is entitled to
relief, for in all criminal cases it is obviously the
whole society that is entitled to relief. Yet the
question remains whether such differentiation
between the objects of international crimes serves
a valid purpose and is at all necessary. The asser-
tion of Israel's sovereignty over the Jewish people
was designed to end "the curse of dispersion and
the want of sovereignty of the people of Israel,
upon whom any criminal could commit his out-
rages without fear of being punished by the people
outraged." 65 But despite this laudable purpose,
this assertion-if giving rise to similar assertions
by other nations over expatriated nationals, their
descendants, and other specially designated
groups-may nevertheless pose a number of prob-
lems in the conduct and the development of inter-
national law.
66
TH INDIVMDUAL'S R-ESPONSIBIInY IN
INENATioNA1 LAW
It has long been recognized that the individual
is not generally subject to international law. Inter-
6 Taylor, Large Questions in the Eichmann Case,
N.Y. Times Magazine 11, 22 (Jan. 22, 1961).
"Interestingly enough, the earlier draft of Israel's
Nazi Punishment Law dealt only with "war crime"
and "crime against humanity." The laxiguage in the
present law which deals with "crime against the Jewish
people" is much akin to the language in the Genocide
Convention. See Trial Judgment 16, 17, 33.
"' Trial Judgment 35.
"Katz, The Role of Law in International Affairs as
Illusrated by the Eichmann Case, 84 N.J.L.J. 1 (1961).
national law pertains to the rights and duties of
nations or sovereigns, and it is only through the
sovereign that the individual becomes indirectly
involved. The traditionalists have argued that
"Individuals alone being subjects of criminal
law.., and international law prescribing no sanc-
tions for individual offenders, these last cannot be
subjected to an international jurisdiction."17 Yet
both in the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Eich-
mann case individuals were on trial for what was
commonly described as violations of international
law. At Nuremberg a multi-national tribunal was
asserting its jurisdiction under international law.
In the Jerusalem courtroom it was a national
tribunal dispensing domestic justice according to
a law described to have been derived from the
provisions of the law of nations. In both instances
the motivators or active participants in the Third
Reich's national policy were put on trial as in-
dividuals. But the trial of an individual for acts
authorized, ordered, or sanctioned by his govern-
ment has been described as a practice that may
raise havoc in the orderly future conduct of govern-
mental business. Should an individual be held
responsible for acts performed in the service of
his nation? It was the argument of Adolph Eich-
mann that:
"[M]y honor is loyalty .... [Tihe question of
conscience is a matter for the head of state, the
sovereign.... [Tihe head of my state ordered
deportations, and the part I played in these de-
67 Pella, supra note 43, at 40. For a discussion of
individual responsibility under international law, see
Survey of International Law in Relation to the Work of
Codification of the International Law Commission, U.N.
Doc. A/CN. 4/1 REv. 1, Feb. 10, 1949, pp. 19-22. It is
worth noting, also, that in 1944 Prof. Hans Kelsen
published in the annex to his book, PEAcE TmouGH
LAw, a draft of a proposed Treaty Stipulation Establish-
ing Individual Responsibility for Violations of Inter-
national Law. See, furthermore, Schick, International
Criminal Law-Facts and Illusions, 11 Mon. L. R1v.
290 (1948), to the effect that the first significant
attempts were made only at the end of the First World
War to create individual criminal responsibility under
international law for "political offenses." It is in-
teresting to note, also, that in the post civil war period
the United States Supreme Court had before it several
cases involving what may be described as war crimes,
and the Court consistently adhered to the opinion that
it is a principle of public international law that domestic
courts have no jurisdiction to try enemy persons for
acts committed during and as part of belligerent
operations, even though alleged to have been committed
in violation of the laws of war. Ford v. Surget, 97 U.S.
594 (1878); Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509 (1878);
Dow v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158 (1879); Freeland v.
Williams, 131 U.S. 405 (1889). See Finch, Jurisdiction
of Local Courts to Try Enemy Persons for War Crimes,
14 Am J. INTL L. 218 (1920).
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portations emanated from the Master at the
top."
Eichmann's counsel likewise argued that under the
theory of "act of state" 9 only the sovereign should
be held liable for the acts of his nationals in carry-
ing out state policy. 0 He stressed the pragmatic
plight of the individual enmeshed in the mission
of his country. Said Dr. Robert Servatius:
"The basic principle of every state is loyalty to
and confidence in the leadership. The deed is
dumb and obedience is blind. These are the
virtues on which alone a state can build its
foundations."'
The Eichmann case will apparently serve further
to establish the responsibility of the individual in
international criminal law. For centuries scholars
and legal tribunals have wrestled with the plea of
superior orders. Only in this century has the law
of najions come firmly to reject this defense,
particularly in instances where the orders were
manifestly unlawful and especially in cases of high
ranking officers who had time to reflect upon the
legality of orders given them.72 Obviously, there
is a need for the extension of international criminal
8Attorney General v. Adolph Eichmann, crim.
case 40/61, Jerusalem District Court, transcript 7.7.61;
Session 88 11.
6 Kelsen, Collective and Individual Responsibility in
International Law With Particular Regard to the Punish-
ment of War Criminals, 33 CALIF. L. REv. 530 (1943).7
0 Possibly one of the earliest recognitions given by
positive international law to individual responsibility
for war crimes was incorporated in the post World War
I Versailles Treaty. Although recent legal writings have
somehow overlooked the Versailles Treaty, and the
Nuremberg and Eichmann Tribunals also failed to
refer to it, this treaty should be noted for its prescription
of penalties for war crimes. By Article 227, the Allied
Powers arraigned William II, the former German
Emperor, for "a supreme offence against international
morality and the sanctity of treaties." The Kaiser was
to be tried by a special tribunal to be guided by "the
highest motives of international policy, with a view to
vindicating the solemn obligations of international
undertakings and the validity of international
morality." This indeed was to be a forerunner of the
Nuremberg "crime against peace." The trial did not
take place, since William II fled to the Netherlands. In
addition, Article 228 of the treaty provided that "The
German Government recognizes the right of the Allied
and Associated Powers to bring before military tri-
bunals persons accused of having committed acts in
violation of the laws and customs of war," and Germany
further agreed to surrender all persons charged with
having committed such acts. See Report of the Com-
mission of the Versailles Conference, 14 Am. J. INT'L
L. 95 (1920).
7 Trial Judgment 216.
72 In 1906 Oppenheim wrote that "violation of rules
regarding warfare are war crimes only when committed
without an order of the belligerent Government con-
cerned." See 2 OPPENHEi , INTERNATiONAL LAw 264
(1906).
law to individuals. The Nuremberg Tribunal cor-
rectly observed:
"Crimes against international law are com-
mitted by men, not by abstract entities, and
only by punishing individuals who commit such
crimes can the provisions of international law be
enforced.... The principle of international law
which, under certain circumstances, protects the
representatives of a state, cannot be applied to
acts which are condemned as criminal by inter-
national law.'""
But however desirable it may be to see the ushering
in of a system of international law which would
protect the individual against the injustices of
foreign powers as well as of his own sovereign, it is
dubious whether this can be properly accomplished
by permitting one nation to sit in judgment in an
ad hoc fashion on actions performed under the
authority of another nation. If certain rights of
individuals are to be protected and certain stand-
ards of national conduct are to be enforced, it is
essential that these rights and standards be clearly
and positively defined by the international com-
munity, to make certain that political interests and
national prejudices do not take the place of inter-
national law.,
CONCLUSIONS
The majority of legal commentators on the
Eichmaun case have upheld the right of the State
of Israel, in conformity with international law, to
try the kidnaped Adolph Eichmann in an Israeli
court under an admittedly extra-territorial and
retroactive Israeli law.74 Most writers go no further
in the review of the case, considering the legal
matter closed upon the determination of legality.75
But the unfortunate truth appears to be that the
legality of the Eichmann case is not derived from
7 'Leavy, The Eichmann Trial, Report from Jerusalem,
37 CALIF. B.J. 243, 246 (1962).
74 For a strong argument against the legality of the
trial, see Wechsler, Adolph Eichmann ... and the Law,
19 N.Y. CountY L.B. BULL. 101 (1962). While up-
holding Israel's jurisdiction, some commentators
expressed criticism of the trial's failure to comply with
certain recognized procedural standards. The complaint
has been heard that the court was not an unbiased one,
due to the pre-trial pronouncement of Eichmann's guilt
by one of the judges. The further complaint has been
made that holding the trial in Israel not only meant
trial in a hostile jurisdiction, but also deprived the
defendant from producing witnesses of his choice. See,
also, Cardozo, When Extradition Fails, Is Abduction ti
Solution? 55 Am. J. IN'L L. 127 (1961).75 An outstanding exception is the searching article
of Schwarzenberger, The Eichmann Judgment, 1962
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the particular compliance of this case with some
high and taxing standards of the law, but from
the general permissiveness of the applicable inter-
national law, under which, apparently, "every in-
dependent state, has jurisdiction to punish war
criminals in its custody regardless of the nationality
of the victim, the time it entered the war, or the
place where the offense was committed."7
6
Indeed, even some of the commentators who
found the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal ob-
jectionable on the ground that it penalized political
offenses (such as "crime against peace") hitherto
not recognized in international law, have not made
the same objection to the trial of Eichmann, who
was tried and convicted for "crime against hu-
manity" (of which the "crime against Jews" is a
mere particularization) and "war crime"-both
of which have had a longer history and recognition
in international law."
The fact that the trial of Eichmann did not
constitute a violation of international law, fails
to answer completely the question whether Israel's
conduct in this case conforms to the standards of
international conduct required to meet the growing
needs of a world society striving for a greater de-
gree of order and security through more effective
standards of world law. As has been providently
pointed out, "the important thing is that the trial
and judgment shall not only be but appear to be
just and fair, and shall contribute to the growth
of law among the nations."78
The trial of Eichmann complied with only a part
of this admonition. It is undeniable that the actual
conduct of Eichmann's public trial complied with a
high standard of judicial process and also effec-
tively conveyed this impression to the world
community. But while in the long run the case will
in most likelihood help fortify the body of inter-
national criminal law-through its reiteration of
the Nuremberg principles and the reassertion of
individual responsibility-it has unfortunately
left the impression that this result was partially
produced through force. Indeed, the illegal force
employed in bringing the accused to trial made it
unclear in the mind of the world whether it was
"force" or whether it was "justice" which had
won in the last analysis. The keen observation
7 Cowles, Universality of Jurisdidcin over War
Crimea, 33 CAmrX. L. REv. 177, 218 (1945).
7 Compare Schick, International Criminal Law-
Facts and Illusions, 11 MOD. L. Rzv. 290 (1948), with
Green, The Eichmann Case, 23 MOD. L. REv. 507
(1960).78 Taylor, supra note 63, at 25.
has been made in this connection that "the cause
of law is always poorly served by lawless law en-
forcement." 9 Clearly, the precedent-setting value
of the case, which gives recognition to universally
enforced international criminal penalties, suffers
from the fact that Eichmann's apprehension and
punishment were not accomplished through
judicial process only.80 In the final analysis, it has
been suggested, the trial of Eichmann failed to
answer the fear of those who can see the misuse of
the name of international law, in future times, by a
victorious force which may not necessarily be on
the side of justice. But what is feared most, in-
deed, is the impact of lawless law enforcement on
our own morality and judicial institutions rather
than that it may provide, in the future, an "ex-
cuse" or "precedent" for the "wrong" victor who
requires little or any such precedent.
Because of the criticism of the Nuremberg trial
as one conducted under the auspices of the vic-
torious powers, it was the hope of many that future
international tribunals would be more broadly
constituted, in order to alleviate the fear of po-
litically motivated or oriented justice and to lend
future judgments wider international scope,,
Unfortunately, Israel's decision, based on under-
standable domestic needs, to try Eichmann in its
own courts, has not complied with this hope. The
absence of an existing international criminal
tribunal made it difficult for Israel to do otherwise.
Yet it is feared that this unilateral enforcement
may considerably weaken the case's role as an
effective deterrent against future international
criminal behavior.
In bringing the Eichmann case before a domestic
rather than an international tribunal, Israel never-
theless acted in accordance with historical practices
and may have very well contributed to the joint
national-international responsibility for the crea-
tion and enforcement of international criminal
law. The inability or unwillingness of the inter-
79 Wechsler, supra note 74, at 102.
8 See Cardozo, supra note 74, at 135. "We strongly
champion the rule of law in world affairs. Consequently,
it must be our position that the only acceptable way to
deal with fugitive war criminals is through orderly
processes of international law and extradition."
8t Wechsler, supra note 74, at 103, has complained
that trial in Israel has "an obvious vindictive aspect."
See also ROGAT, TnsE EIcHmr A- TIAL ANm =r RuLE
or LAW 41 (1961): "[Israel's] decision that she alone
should try Eiclmann for crime against Jews rather than
having an international tribunal try him for crimes
against human beings is precisely the kind of decision




national community in the past to adopt an
international criminal code and to establish an
international criminal tribunal must not, indeed,
deter individual nations from adopting and reason-
ably expanding their own internal legal principles,
derived from what is already generally acknowl-
edged among nations. Israel's reliance upon the
principle of Nuremberg and the Genocide Con-
vention as authority for its own law may serve as a
prime example of a healthy cross influence between
national and international law. As the observer for
the International Commission of Jurists clearly
pointed out:
"The Eichmann trial is an illustration of inter-
national penal justice. This justice, which is still
in the first phases of its development, or what
is often called a 'primitive' state, is adminis-
tered mainly by states. A state fulfills this task
by applying international law either directly or
through its body of laws."'
Critics of Nuremberg have argued, and the same
argument could be repeated in the Eichmann case,
that:
"Before one may expect the creation of an inter-
national criminal law as enunciated at Nurem-
berg it will first be necessary to accept, and to
practice without crippling reservations, the
principle of compulsory jurisdiction of an inter-
national court or agency over States in all their
disputes even though these disputes may be
claimed to be political in character."'n
Pleas for an international criminal code and an
international criminal tribunal will continue to be
made. Whether the code or tribunal should come
first is already subject to disagreement. In response
to the claim that without an international criminal
code, "real progress in international law and
security is impossible," the assertion is made that
"in many cases international criminal law can
achieve nothing unless there be an international
2 Papadatos, The Eichmann Trial, Bull. Int'l Comm.
of Jurists 13 (no. 14, Oct. 1962).
13 Schick, supra note 77, at 305.
court to apply it."' ' Furthermore, the precedent
of the World Court may indicate that international
accord could more easily be obtained for the estab-
lishment of an international criminal tribunal than
for the enactment of a comprehensive international
criminal code.
The defects in the Eichmann case, it is hoped,
may possibly serve to stress again the need for a
permanent international criminal tribunal.85 The
Eichmann case, indeed, furnished an opportunity
for the establishment of an ad hoc tribunal in the
Nuremberg tradition, but the opportunity was not
seized. It is obvious that the only constant means
for preventing future misuse of international law
will be through the constitution of such an inter-
national tribunal, to act within the confines of the
best international judicial traditions, and to super-
vise the healthy development of an international
"criminal" rather than "political" international
law. This obviously has not come to pass as yet.
In the interim, it is quite likely that the historical
facts may tend to justify the position of Justice
Jackson that we cannot await a perfect interna-
tional tribunal or legislature, 8 and that inter-
national law must develop, as did the common law,
through custom, agreement, and judicial prece-
dent, such as the Nuremberg and Eichmann trials
themselves--despite their defects-were intended
to provide.
84 Pella, supra note 43, at 68.
86 Even those who challenged Israel's jurisdiction to
try Eichmann have stressed "that many of the criticisms
concerning the jurisdiction of the tribunal in the
Eicmann case could have been avoided through the
institution of an international trial." See Woetzel, The
Eichmann Case in Internaional Law, 1962 CRM. L.
REv. 671, 681 (1962).86 Report of Robert H. Jackson to the President, in
Trial of War Criminals, Document, U.S. Dept. of
State, Pub. 2420, p. 9 (1945). See also observation of
Henry L. Stimson that international law is "not a
body of authoritative codes or statutes; it is the gradual
expression, case by case, of the moral judgments of the
civilized world." Stimson, The Nuremberg Trial: A
Landmark in Law, 25 FoRE IGN A.nrsns 179, 189
(1947).
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